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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Joshua Michael Moses appeals from the judgment of conviction entered 
upon the jury verdicts finding him guilty of grand theft by extortion with a 
persistent violator enhancement. Moses claims error in relation to the district 
court's evidentiary ruling and in the prosecutor's closing arguments. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
On July 24, 2010, at approximately 7:00 a.m., Joshua Branam called his 
brother-in-law, Walter Ward ("Brian") and told him he had been kidnapped, was 
in danger, and that his captors wanted $2,500.00. (Tr., Vol. I, p.215, Ls.5-21; 
p.216, L.8 - p.217, L.10; p.237, L.3 - p.238, L.1.) After speaking with Branam, 
another individual got on the phone, later identified as Moses, and told Brian, "it 
wasn't a joke, it wasn't some Hollywood bUlishit, he wasn't messing around." 
Moses also warned Brian not to go to the police. (Tr., Vol. I, p.238, Ls.6-11.) 
Brian talked to Branam again after talking to Moses. (Tr., Vol. I, p.217, Ls.2-4.) 
During the course of these conversations, Brian was instructed to take the cash 
to a Wal-Mart in Post Falls, Idaho. (Tr., Vol. I, p.238, Ls.12-16.) Brian called a 
friend, Phillip Connell, and asked him to go with him. (Tr., Vol. I, p.166, Ls.10-13; 
p.217, Ls.22-25.) Once Brian and Phillip were together, Brian stopped at several 
ATMs to withdraw the maximum amount until he had the amount demanded. 
(Tr., Vol. I, p.167, L.17 - p.168, L.21; p.217, Ls.8-21.) Brian put a "scrunchie" 
around the money to keep it together. (Tr., Vol. I, p.168, L.24 - p.169, L.1; 
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p.218, Ls.18-24.) Brian and Phillip then proceeded to Wal-Mart. (Tr., Vol. I, 
p.169, Ls.2-12; p.218, Ls.15-17.) 
Brian and Phillip arrived at Wal-Mart at around 9:00 a.m. (Tr., Vol. I, 
p.218, L.25 - p.219, L.2.) Approximately 20 minutes later, Moses approached 
Brian, who was standing outside his vehicle. (Tr., Vol. I, p.170, Ls.2-5; p.220, 
Ls.67.) Moses got in Brian's car with Brian and Phillip, where Brian showed 
Moses the banded money, which Moses took and put in his pocket. (Tr., Vol. I, 
p.220, L.13 - p.221, Ls.14.) Brian then picked up Moses' scooter1 from a 
different part of the parking lot, and Moses eventually directed Brian to a location. 
(Tr., Vol. I, p.221, L.21 - p.226, L.11.) While in the car with Brian, Moses told 
Brian, "taking a life wasn't easy and that it wasn't something that you ever want 
to do." (Tr., Vol. I, p.233, Ls.5-10.) Moses also said Branam owed his uncle 
$2,500 for drugs and referred to Branam as "a fuckin' retard." (Tr., Vol. I, p.235, 
L.23 - p.236, L.4.) 
Once Brian arrived at the designated location, Moses got out with his 
motorcycle. (Tr., Vol. I, p.226, Ls.12-17.) Moses told Brian to drive to the 
entrance of a specified trailer park and wait for Branam. (Tr., Vol. I, p.226, LS.8-
11.) Brian went to the trailer park as instructed. (Tr., Vol. I, p.226, Ls.23-25.) 
While Brian was waiting for Branam, he saw Moses drive by on his scooter. (Tr., 
Vol. I, p.227, Ls.15-21.) Brian next saw Branam walking toward him. (Tr., Vol. I, 
p.228, Ls.14-19.) Branam had numerous injuries to his face, including a swollen 
cheek, a black eye, a split lip, and a cut above his eye. (Tr., Vol. I, p.180, LS.6-
1 At times, Moses' scooter is also referred to as a motorcycle. 
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16; p.229, Ls.14-23.) According to Phillip, Branam looked "very shaken and 
scared." (Tr., Vol. I, p.180, Ls.17-18.) 
Brian drove Branam to a different part of town where Branam got out and 
talked to a man in a black truck. (Tr., Vol. I, p.230, L.16 - p.231, L.15.) Branam 
then left on foot and Brian drove to his wife's work. (Tr., Vol. I, p.231, Ls.16-25.) 
Brian, his wife, Shay, who is also Branam's sister, and Phillip went to talk to the 
police. (Tr., Vol. I, p.232, Ls.2-25.) 
The state charged Moses with grand theft by extortion.2 (R, Vol. I, pp.85-
86, 135-36; R, Vol. II, pp.202-03.) The state also alleged Moses is a persistent 
violator. (R, Vol. I, pp.86, 136; R., Vol. II, p.203.) The case proceeded to trial 
after which the jury found Moses guilty of the charged offense and the persistent 
violator enhancement. (R, Vol. II, pp.299-300.) The court imposed a unified 30-
year sentence with 10 years fixed, but retained jurisdiction. (R, Vol. II, pp.314-
16.) Moses filed a timely notice of appeal. (R, Vol. II, pp.317-20.) 
2 The state also originally charged Moses with robbery and kidnapping, but later 
dismissed those charges. (R, p.73.) 
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ISSUES 
Moses states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court err when it permitted Mr. Branam's 
statements to Mr. Ward to be introduced under I.R.E. 
801 (d)(2)(B) as an adoptive admission by Mr. Moses despite a 
lack of foundation? 
2. Did the district court err when the court refused to permit Mr. 
Moses to inquire about a juror who expressed reservations 
about his ability to participate given the anxiety attacks the juror 
was experiencing? 
3. Did the district court err when it refused to permit Mr. Moses to 
call a witness to the stand to testify about Mr. Branam's prior 
consistent statements after the court had allowed the State to 
present Mr. Branam's prior inconsistent statements? 
4. Did the prosecutor commit misconduct by shifting the burden of 
proof to Mr. Moses during closing arguments? 
5. Did the prosecutor commit misconduct, rising to the level of a 
fundamental error, by arguing facts not in evidence, misstating 
the evidence, and appealing to the passions and prejudices of 
the jurors? 
6. Does the cumulative error doctrine require reversal in this case? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.14.) 
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
1. Should the Court decline to consider Branam's claim that the district court 
erred in granting the state's motion to admit Branam's statements as adoptive 
admissions because Moses' challenge on appeal was not preserved below? 
Alternatively, does Moses' claim that the district court cannot make a pre-trial 
evidentiary ruling based on the state's offer of proof fail as a matter of law? 
2. Has Moses failed to establish the district court violated Moses' right to a 
competent jury by not allowing him to examine a juror regarding anxiety the juror 
expressed to the bailiff during the middle of trial? 
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3. Has Moses failed to establish error in the district court's ruling denying his 
request to present cumulative evidence of statements Branam allegedly made 
prior to Moses' preliminary hearing? 
4. Has Moses failed to establish the prosecutor improperly shifted the burden 
of proof by discussing the evidence offered in relation to Moses' jury instruction 
advising the jury that they were to consider the evidence "offered that at the time 
of the alleged offense the defendant was ignorant of, or mistakenly believed 
certain facts"? 
5. Has Moses failed to establish the prosecutor's closing arguments 
constituted error, much less fundamental error? 
6. Has Moses failed to establish cumulative error? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
Moses Has Failed To Establish The District Court Erred In Granting The State's 
Pre-Trial Motion To Admit Branam's Statements As Adoptive Admissions 
A. Introduction 
Prior to trial, the state filed a motion seeking leave to introduce the 
statements Branam made to Brian during the July 24, 2010 call, that his life was 
in danger and he needed money, as adoptive admissions of Moses. (R., Vol. II, 
pp.207-210.) The court granted the state's motion over Moses' foundation 
objection. (Tr., Vol. I, p.35, L.6 - p.37, L.5; p.39, L.19 - p.41, L.14.) On appeal, 
Moses claims the district court erred in granting the state's motion, asserting that, 
"the State failed to establish the necessary foundation for admission of such 
statements" because the state did not present any "evidence" at the hearing on 
its motion. (Appellant's Brief, pp.15-18.) The Court should decline to address 
this argument because it was not preserved for appeal. Alternatively, the 
argument fails as a matter of law because it does not constitute an abuse of 
discretion to make a pre-trial evidentiary ruling based on the state's offer of proof. 
B. Standard Of Review 
''The trial court has broad discretion in the admission of evidence, and its 
judgment will be reversed only when there has been a clear abuse of discretion." 
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 218, 245 P.3d 961, 970 (2010) (citations omitted). 
When the appellate court reviews an evidentiary ruling for abuse of discretion, it 
considers (1) whether the trial court perceived the issue as discretionary; (2) 
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whether the trial court acted within the boundaries of its discretion and consistent 
with any applicable legal standards; and (3) whether the trial court exercised 
reason in reaching its decision. State v. Hoak, 147 Idaho 919, 921, 216 P.3d 
1291,1293 (Ct. App. 2009) (citation omitted). 
C. Moses Has Failed To Establish The District Court Abused Its Discretion In 
Admitting Branam's Statements To Brian 
The district court found that Branam's statements to Brian that his life was 
in danger and he needed $2,500.00 were admissible as an "adoptive admission" 
under Idaho Rule of Evidence 801 (d)(2). (Tr., Vol. I, p.40, L.13 - p.41, L.14.) 
Rule 801 (d)(2) provides that a statement is not hearsay if: 
[t]he statement is offered against a party and is (A) the party's own 
statement, in either an individual or a representative capacity, or (B) 
a statement of which the party has manifested an adoption or belief 
in its truth, or (C) a statement by a person authorized by a party to 
make a statement concerning the subject, or (D) a statement by a 
party's agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of the 
agency or employment of the servant or agent, made during the 
existence of the relationship, or (E) a statement by a co-conspirator 
of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy. 
For the first time on appeal, Moses argues that the district court erred in 
granting the state's motion to admit Branam's statements because the state 
failed to present any "evidence" at the hearing on the motion demonstrating 
"Moses was actually present when Mr. Branam made the statements to [Brian], 
no evidence that he understood what Mr. Branam was saying, and no evidence 
[he] intended to adopt these remarks as his own." (Appellant's Brief, p.17.) 
Moses complains "[t]he sole evidence the State presented was the prosecutor's 
mere assertion that Mr. Moses was also talking to Mr. Ward during the phone 
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conversation." (Appellant's Brief, p.i7.) Thus, Moses concludes, the district 
court erred in granting the state's motion because "the arguments of the parties 
are not evidence in criminal proceedings." (Appellant's Brief, pp.17-18.) The 
Court should decline to consider this claim because it was not preserved below. 
While Moses' objection to the state's motion in limine was based upon an 
alleged lack of foundation, the foundational argument he made below was 
different than the one he makes on appeal. At the hearing on the state's motion, 
Moses argued that the state could not lay foundation without Branam's testimony 
and noted the state's failure to include Branam on its witness list or subpoena 
him for trial. (Tr., Vol. I, p.35, L.16 - p.36, L.10; p.39, Ls.19-24.) This objection 
is distinctly different than Moses' foundational claim on appeal, which is based on 
an assertion that the state was required to present evidence at the motion 
hearing before the court could make a pre-trial ruling on the admissibility of the 
evidence. Moses' objection on one foundational theory is inadequate to preserve 
a different foundational challenge. State v. Vondenkamp, 141 Idaho 878, 885, 
119 P.3d 653, 660 (Ct. App. 2005) (citations omitted) ("An objection on one 
ground will not preserve a separate and different basis for excluding the 
evidence."). Because Moses did not preserve his foundational challenge, this 
Court should decline to consider it. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 224, 245 P.3d 
961, 976 (2010) ("Generally Idaho's appellate courts will not consider error not 
preserved for appeal through an objection at trial."). 
Even if the Court considers Moses' claim, Moses' assertion that the state 
was required to present evidence at the hearing on its motion before the district 
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court could rule on the admissibility of the proposed evidence is contrary to law. 
In State v. Parmer, 147 Idaho 210, 215, 207 P.3d 186, 191 (Ct. App. 2009), the 
Court of Appeals noted that a district court may "[r]el[y] on an oral or written offer 
of proof in determining the admissibility of Rule 404(b) evidence" in "mak[ing] the 
requisite initial finding that a prior bad act is established as fact." See also I.R.E. 
104(a). There is no reason to believe that a district court could not rely on the 
same type of offer for other pre-trial evidentiary rulings, which is precisely what 
the court did in this case. 
The state's Brief in Support of Motion in Limine advised the court: 
[Brian] Ward answered the phone at 7:00am [sic] on July 24, 
2010. The person calling Ward was Joshua Branam, Ward's 
brother-n-Iaw [sic]. Branam told Ward that he was in trouble and he 
needed $2,500 or he would be killed. After making that statement, 
another male with a Hispanic accent apparently took the phone 
from Branam and told Ward that he was not fucking around, this 
was not Hollywood, that he wanted the money and to meet him at 
Walmart. The phone was handed back to Branam and a second 
conversation ensued between Ward and Branam. During this 
second conversation, Ward could hear the Hispanic male yelling at 
Branam calling him stupid. Ward has identified the Hispanic 
voice as that of the Defendant. 
(R., Vol. II, pp.208-209 (emphasis added).) 
Notably, Moses does not contend that the content of the state's offer of 
proof was insufficient foundation nor does he claim that the state did not lay the 
proper foundation at trial at which time Brian testified consistent with the state's 
offer. (Tr., Vol. I, p.238, Ls.6-11.) Moses' only claim is that the court abused its 
discretion by making a ruling based solely on the state's offer for proof. Because 
this claim is contrary to law, it is without merit. 
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II. 
Moses Has Failed To Establish A Violation Of His Constitutional Right To A 
Impartial JUry 
A. Introduction 
Moses contends his constitutional right to a competent jury was violated 
when the district court would not allow him to question a juror about anxiety the 
juror expressed on the second day of trial with respect to the "back and forth" and 
the "contentious" nature of the proceedings. (Appellant's Brief, p.19.) Moses' 
claim fails. The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining Moses' 
request to re-open voir dire during trial upon learning of Juror 69's anxiety 
because there was no indication that Juror 69's anxiety prevented him from being 
impartial or following the court's instruction as required by the Constitution. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of appellate review applicable to constitutional issues is one 
of deference to factual findings, unless they are clearly erroneous, but free 
review of whether constitutional requirements have been satisfied in light of the 
facts found. State v. Bromgard, 139 Idaho 375, 380, 79 P.3d 734, 739 (Ct. App. 
2003); State v. Smith, 135 Idaho 712,720,23 P.3d 786, 794 (Ct. App. 2001). 
"It is well settled that the scope of voir dire examination is within the 
discretion of the trial judge and that his ruling will not be disturbed except for a 
manifest abuse of discretion." State v. Daniels, 134 Idaho 896, 898, 11 P.3d 
1114, 1116 (2000) (quoting State v. Bitz, 93 Idaho 239, 244, 460 P.2d 374, 379 
(1969)). 
10 
C. Moses Has Failed To Establish A Violation Of His Constitutional Right To 
An Impartial JUry 
On the second day of trial, Juror 69 advised the bailiff that he was "having 
anxiety issues and [was] not sure he could continue." (Tr., Vol. I, p.285, LS.22-
24.) The court asked the bailiff whether it "would help [the juror] if he were just 
by himself in a different jury room," to which the bailiff answered, he "didn't go 
into that." (Tr., Vol. I, p.285, L.24 - p.286, L.2.) The court advised the bailiff to 
see if "that would make him more comfortable." (Tr., Vol. I, p.286, Ls.3-4.) When 
the bailiff returned, he reported that Juror 69 "has anxiety issues and is having 
some difficulty with the back and forth and the contentious nature of the 
proceedings." (Tr., Vol. I, p.286, Ls.23-25.) When asked by the bailiff if he "had 
any suggestions on what might be done to minimize that," Juror 69 could not 
"come up with anything." (Tr., Vol. I, p.286, L.25 - p.287, L.4.) At that time, 
Moses asked for "a little more information on the juror that suffers with the 
anxiety to make sure that that's not something that is gonna prevent him from 
listening to every bit of the testimony." (Tr., Vol. I, p.288, Ls.14-18.) 
The state objected to Moses' request to inquire of the juror because the 
juror had not "said anything to make anyone aware that he can't be fair and 
impartial in this case." (Tr., Vol. I, p.289, Ls.3-5.) The prosecutor also expressed 
concern about "singl[ing]" the juror out and questioning him about his anxiety. 
(Tr., Vol. I, p.289, Ls.5-10.) The court declined Moses' request to question Juror 
69 and instead indicated it would "simply announce to the entire panel that if 
anybody feels at any time that they do need a break, to please bring that to the 
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court's attention." (Tr., Vol. I, p.289, Ls.11-16.) The court instructed the jury 
accordingly. (Tr., Vol. I, p.291, Ls.5-9.) 
On appeal, Moses complains that although he had the opportunity to 
examine the juror during voir dire, "this particular juror's physical and/or mental 
reaction to the trial proceedings did not become apparent until he was already 
seated and tasked with hearing and evaluating the evidence in this case," and 
once that became apparent, Moses claims he "had a constitutional right to 
adequately inquire of this juror" about the "nature, frequency, effects, and extent 
of the panic attacks he was suffering during the trial.,,3 (Appellant's Brief, pp.20-
21.) 
In support of this argument, Moses relies on Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 
719 (1992). (Appellant's Brief, p.20.) Specifically, Moses quotes the following 
language from Morgan to support his claim: "part of the guarantee of a 
defendant's right to an impartial jury is an adequate voir dire to identify 
unqualified jurors." (Appellant's Brief, p.20 (quoting Morgan, 504 U.S. at 729).) 
While this is an accurate statement from Morgan, it has no application to the 
circumstances at issue in this case because the fact that Juror 69 indicated he 
was experiencing anxiety on the second day of trial due to the "contentious 
nature of the proceedings," does not suggest that he could not satisfy his 
constitutional role as a juror. As explained in Morgan, voir dire allows the trial 
judge to fulfill her "responsibility to remove prospective jurors who will not be able 
impartially to follow the court's instructions and evaluate the evidence." 504 U.S. 
3 Moses' characterization of Juror 69's anxiety as "panic attacks" is unsupported 
by the record. (See generally Tr., Vol. I, p.285, L.22 - p.287, L.4.) 
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at 730. Juror 69's anxiety was not an expression of impartiality or bias that 
obligated the district court to re-open voir dire to allow Moses to explore his 
concern that the juror's anxiety may prevent him from listening. (Tr., Vol. I, 
p.288, Ls.13-22.) Moses has therefore failed to establish the district court 
violated his constitutional right by failing to re-open voir dire to allow him to ask 
Juror 69 about his anxiety.4 
III. 
Moses Has Failed To Establish The District Court Committed Evidentiary Error In 
Denying His Request To Introduce Cumulative Evidence Of Branam's Prior 
Statements 
A. Introduction 
Moses asserts the district court abused its discretion in denying his 
request to present cumulative evidence of Branam's prior statements. 
(Appellant's Brief, p.21.) Moses is incorrect. The district court correctly 
concluded that the proposed testimony was not proper rebuttal. 
4 Moses further argues, "even if the denial of his request to ask any questions of 
this juror did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation, it was at the very 
least an abuse of the court's discretion in light [sic] the constitutional issues at 
stake." (Appellant's Brief, p.20 n.5.) Moses, however, cites no legal authority in 
support of this assertion, nor does he provide any argument to support this claim. 
This Court should, therefore, decline to consider any separate ground for relief 
beyond the constitutional claim actually briefed by Moses. State v. Zichko, 129 
Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996) ("When issues on appeal are not 
supported by propositions of law, authority, or argument, they will not be 
considered."). Even if the Court considers Moses' non-constitutional "argument," 
the state submits he has also failed to establish the district court abused its 
discretion by declining Moses' request to examine Juror 69 regarding his anxiety 
and instead electing to instruct the jurors that if they needed a break from the 
proceedings, they could request a recess. 
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B. Standard Of Review 
"The trial court has broad discretion in the admission of evidence, and its 
judgment will be reversed only when there has been a clear abuse of discretion." 
Perry, 150 Idaho at 218, 245 P.3d at 970. 
C. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In Denying Moses' 
Request To Introduce Additional Evidence Of Branam's Prior Statements 
During his case-in-chief, Moses presented the testimony Branam gave at 
Moses' preliminary hearing. The general substance of that testimony was that it 
was Branam's idea to extort money from Brian and, although Moses went to get 
the money from Brian and directed Brian where to find Branam, Moses had no 
idea that he was part of an extortion scheme. (See generally Tr., Vol. I, pp.397-
422.) In rebuttal, the state presented evidence that, since the date of Moses' 
preliminary hearing, Branam told Ward that he lied at the hearing because he 
was afraid he would be killed in prison and he reaffirmed his initial claim that 
Moses beat him and extorted money. (Tr., Vol. I, p.436, L.5 - p.438, L.3.) The 
state also presented testimony from Officer Scott Harmon who Branam had also 
told that Moses beat him and made him obtain money for his release. (Tr., Vol. I, 
p.441 , L.17 - p.443, L.7.) 
After the state rested its rebuttal case, Moses advised the court of his 
desire to introduce the testimony of two additional witnesses - Christian Beech, 
who testified that he witnessed a 'conversation between Branam and Moses 
where Branam denied he had been kidnapped and admitted he received money 
(Tr., Vol. II, pA78, L.20 - pA81, L.25), and another unidentified person who 
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counsel still needed to interview (Tr., Vol. I, p.449, Ls.15-18; p.453, Ls.5-12). 
The following day, counsel for Moses identified the second witness as Ed 
Yankey. (Tr., Vol. II, p.468, Ls.17-19.) Counsel represented that Yankey's 
'testimony "would be that he was housed in P pod with Joshua Branam" at the jail 
and Branam allegedly told him that "Moses was in jail because of him, and he 
shouldn't be in jail because Josh Moses didn't do anything wrong." (Tr., Vol. II, 
p.468, L.21 - p.469, L.7.) The court allowed Moses to present Beech's 
testimony, but not Yankey's, noting he did not think either constituted "proper 
rebuttal." (Tr., Vol. II, p.469, Ls.12-25.) 
Moses contends the district court erred in denying his request to present 
Yankey's testimony because, he argues, Branam's alleged statements to Yankey 
were admissible as prior statements "offered to rebut an express or implied 
charge against declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive," 
I.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B), and the statements were not cumulative to Beech's 
testimony. (Appellants' Brief, pp.23-24.) Both of these arguments fail. 
The policy underlying the rule allowing the admissibility of prior consistent 
statements to rebut a claim of recent fabrication is to show that the declarant 
made statements similar to those claimed to be false in a context where there 
was no undue influence. State v. McAway, 127 Idaho 54, 58-59, 896 P.2d 962, 
966-67 (1995) (CARES interview admissible as prior consistent statements 
where defendant claimed child's testimony at trial was the result of 
"programming" by the child's mother). Branam's alleged statements to Yankey 
are not consistent with this policy because they were made to Yankey while 
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Branam was in jail and operating under the same fear that led him to testify 
falsely at Moses' preliminary hearing. Thus, the district court did not err in 
concluding the statements were not proper sur-rebuttal.5 Branam's alleged 
statements to Yankey were also cumulative to the statements testified to by 
Beech. While, as Moses notes, the context in which the statements were made 
were different in that Moses was physically present for Branam's alleged 
statements to Beech but was apparently not present when Branam talked to 
Yankey (Appellant's Brief, pp.23-24), Branam was incarcerated on both 
occasions and his underlying fear was the same - fear of retribution for being a 
"snitch." Thus, any distinction between Branam's statements to Beech and his 
statements to Yankey based on context is unpersuasive for purposes of deciding 
whether the evidence was cumulative. 
D. Even If Error, The Exclusion Of Yankey's Testimony Was Harmless 
'''Where error concerns evidence omitted at trial, the test is whether there 
is a reasonable possibility that the lack of excluded evidence might have 
contributed to the conviction.'" State v. Harris, 132 Idaho 843, 847, 979 P.2d 
1201, 1205 (1999) (quoting State v. Pressnall, 119 Idaho 207, 209, 804 P.2d 
936, 938 (Ct. App. 1991 )). Even if the district court erred in excluding Yankey's 
testimony, the error was harmless given the cumulative nature of Yankey's 
5 The district court's reasoning for concluding as much is not entirely clear; 
however, this Court may affirm on any basis supported by the record. Total 
Success Investments, LLC v. Ada County Highway Dist., 148 Idaho 688, 696, 
227 P.3d 942, 950 (Ct. App. 2010) ("an appellate court may affirm the district 
court's decision if an alternative legal basis supports it"). 
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proposed testimony in conjunction with the weight of the state's evidence that 
Moses was, in fact, involved in the extortion. 
IV. 
Moses Has Failed To Establish The Prosecutor Shifted The Burden Of Proof 
During Closing Argument 
A. Introduction 
Moses contends the prosecutor "impermissibly shifted the burden of proof' 
during closing argument. (Appellant's Brief, p.24.) A review of the record reveals 
the comments about which Moses complains did not constitute improper burden 
shifting but were instead a fair comment on the evidence offered in relation to 
one of Moses' requested jury instructions. 
B. Standard Of Review 
When an objection to alleged prosecutorial misconduct is raised at trial, 
the appellate court applies a two-part test to determine whether the misconduct 
requires reversal. State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 716, 215 P.3d 414, 436 
(2009) (citations omitted). First, the Court "ask[s] whether the prosecutor's 
challenged action was improper." Id. "If it was not, then there was no 
prosecutorial misconduct." .kL "If the conduct was improper," the Court "then 
consider[s] whether the misconduct prejudiced the defendant's right to a fair trial 
or whether it was harmless." .kL (quotations and citation omitted). 'The 
defendant carries the burden of proving prejudice." .kL "When a defendant is 
unable to demonstrate prejudice, the misconduct will be regarded as harmless 
error." lsL 
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C. The Prosecutor's Closing Argument Did Not Shift The Burden Of Proof 
Moses requested the following instruction, which the court gave: 
For the defendant to be guilty of Grand Theft by Extortion, 
the state must prove the defendant had a particular intent. 
Evidence was offered that at the time of the alleged offense the 
defendant was ignorant of, or mistakenly believed certain facts. 
You should consider such evidence in determining whether the 
defendant had the required intent. 
If from all the evidence you have a reasonable doubt 
whether the defendant had such intent, you must find the defendant 
not guilty. 
(R., Vol. II, pp.238, 287; Tr., Vol. II, p.498, Ls.12-21.) 
The prosecutor re-read this instruction in closing argument (Tr., Vol. II, 
p.511, L.21 - p.512, L.7), then stated: 
If you think about that instruction, it may lead you down to 
the path of what is the evidence that establishes that he was 
ignorant of what was really going on? In other words, let's assume 
for a moment that he's hanging around Mr. Branam who is high on 
meth all the time, that he happens to be in the same house, 
possibly got on the phone, possibly didn't, but just goes on this 
errand for Mr. Branam who he just had a fight with a couple days 
ago, and, uh, picks up this package and doesn't know anything 
about it? 
(Tr., Vol. II, p.512, Ls.8-17). At this point Moses objected, arguing the prosecutor 
was shifting the burden of proof. (Tr., Vol. II, p.512, Ls.18-22.) The court 
overruled the objection (Tr., Vol. II, p.23), and the prosecutor continued: 
The evidence that the defense is relying on to support that 
instruction that he was ignorant of what was really happening is the 
testimony of Mr. Branam. Mr. Branam is not all that credible. Mr. 
Branam has some issues. Mr. Branam is at least in a position that 
it's hard to attach any weight to what he says in terms of that 
testimony because of his drug use, because of his motivations, but 
that's what the defense is relying on for that and nothing else. 
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(Tr., Vol. II, p.512, L.24 - p.513, L.7).6 
On appeal, Moses reasserts his claim that the prosecutor's statements 
constituted improper burden shifting. (Appellant's Brief, pp.25-26.) This 
argument is without merit. 
"Generally, both parties are given wide latitude in making their arguments 
to the jury and discussing the evidence and inferences to be made therefrom." 
Severson, 147 Idaho at 720,215 P.3d at 440 (citations omitted). Moses'defense 
at trial was that he collected a "package" from Brian at Branam's request without 
any knowledge of what was in the package or why he was collecting it. (See 
generally Tr., Vol. I, pp.397 -422.) Presumably, Moses requested Instruction 13f 
because of this defense. It is absurd to suggest, as Moses' argument does, that 
the prosecutor engaged in "misconduct" by discussing the quality of the 
"[e]vidence ... offered that at the time of the alleged offense the defendant was 
ignorant of, or mistakenly believed certain facts evidence presented." It is well-
within the realm of permissible argument for the prosecutor to compare the 
evidence of Moses' intent with the evidence Moses offered in an attempt to 
contradict the state's evidence. Moses' claim to the contrary fails. 
Even if the prosecutor's statements could be perceived as shifting the 
burden of proof, which they cannot, the jury was clearly instructed that it was the 
6 The remainder of the prosecutor's argument regarding Moses' intent reviewed 
the evidence "[o]n the other side," specifically noting Moses going to Wal-Mart, 
"approaching [Brian], taking the money, telling them where to go, making those 
statements about what the money was for, about what had already happened to 
Mr. Branam about taking a life, and then showing them where Mr. Branam was," 
which was followed by Branam appearing and Branam being "roughed up." (Tr., 
Vol. II, p.513, Ls.8-17.) 
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state's burden to prove the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt (R., 
Vol. II, p.281; Tr., Vol. II, p.496, Ls.1-19), and this very standard was included 
within Instruction 13f, which the prosecutor repeated prior to making the 
statements about which Moses complains (R., Vol. II, p.287; Tr., Vol. II, 511, L.21 
- p.512, L.7). Thus, any conceivable error did not rise to the level of a due 
process violation entitling Moses to reversal of his conviction. See Severson, 
147 Idaho at 721,215 P.3d at 441 (finding that although inflammatory comments 
regarding defendant's affair were improper, they were not prejudicial in light of 
the weight of the evidence, the limiting instructions, including an instruction that 
comments of counsel were not evidence, and the fact that the "affair was 
established at trial"); see also Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986) 
("[I]t is not enough that the prosecutors' remarks were undesirable or even 
universally condemned. The relevant question is whether the prosecutors' 
comments so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction 
a denial of due process.") (internal quotations and citations omitted); Smith v. 
Phillips, 455 U.S. 209,219 (1982) ("[T]he touchstone of due process analysis in 
cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of the trial, not the 
culpability of the prosecutor."); United States v. Vaandering, 50 F.3d 696,701-02 
(9th Cir. 1995) ("[C]omments intended to highlight the weaknesses of a 
defendant's case do not shift the burden of proof to the defendant where the 
prosecutor does not argue that a failure to explain them adequately requires a 
guilty verdict and reiterates that the burden of proof is on the government."). 
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V. 
Moses Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error With Respect To His 
Unpreserved Claims Of Prosecutorial Misconduct 
A. Introduction 
In addition to his improper burden shifting claim, Moses raises several 
unpreserved claims of error in relation to the prosecutor's closing argument. 
Specifically, Moses asserts the prosecutor "attempted to induce the jury to render 
a verdict on factors other than the evidence introduced at trial in three ways:" (1) 
by "referr[ing] to facts never placed into evidence[,] i.e., the fact that there existed 
an immunity agreement between Mr. Branam and the State regarding his 
testimony at the preliminary hearing in Mr. Moses' case"; (2) by misleading the 
jury "as to the terms of that agreement by telling the jury Mr. Branam faced 
absolutely no penalty for anything he might say at the preliminary hearing when, 
in fact, the immunity agreement set forth numerous potential penalties should Mr. 
Branam testify falsely"; and (3) by "us[ing] inflammatory language regarding Mr. 
Branam's preliminary hearing testimony ... [to] appeal to the jurors' emotions as 
a vehicle to seek to induce them to disregard this important evidence at trial." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.28.) Review of these claims under the applicable legal 
standards shows no error, much less fundamental error. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"Generally Idaho's appellate courts will not consider error not preserved 
for appeal through an objection at triaL" State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 224,245 
P.3d 961, 976 (2010) (citations omitted). Where a claim is raised for the first time 
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on appeal, the appellate court will consider whether the error alleged qualifies as 
fundamental error. kL., 150 Idaho at 228, 245 P.3d at 980. 
C. Moses Has Failed To Establish Reversible Error In Relation To The 
Prosecutor's Closing Argument 
Unobjected to claims of constitutional error are reviewed using a three-
part test: 
(1) the defendant must demonstrate that one or more of the 
defendant's unwaived constitutional rights were violated, (2) the 
error must be clear or obvious, without the need for any additional 
information not contained in the appellate record, including 
information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical 
decision; and (3) the defendant must demonstrate that the error 
affected the defendant's substantial rights meaning (in most 
instances) that it must have affected the outcome of the trial 
proceedings. 
Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d 978. 
Application of the foregoing standard to Moses' claims of unpreserved 
error demonstrates he has failed to meet his burden of establishing he is entitled 
to reversal of his conviction. 
1. Moses' Claim That The Prosecutor Referred To Evidence Not 
Admitted At Trial Is Belied By The Record 
Moses claims the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing 
argument by referring to the existence of an immunity agreement between 
Branam and the state. (Appellant's Brief, p.28.) Moses contends this was 
misconduct because the existence of an immunity agreement was "never placed 
into evidence." (Appellant's Brief, p.28.) Moses, however, offers no argument, 
beyond this naked assertion regarding the alleged impropriety of the prosecutor's 
reference to the immunity agreement with Barnam. (See generally Appellant's 
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Brief, pp.28-30.) The Court should, therefore, not consider this claim. Zichko, 
supra. Even if the Court considers the claim, Moses cannot establish error on 
this basis, much less fundamental error, because the record contradicts his 
claim. 
Prior to trial, Branam advised the court that he would invoke his Fifth 
Amendment right not to incriminate himself if he was subpoenaed to testify at 
Moses'trial. (See Tr., Vol. I, pp.67-71, 345-347.) As a result, Moses asked the 
court to declare Branam unavailable and to allow his preliminary hearing 
testimony to be read into the record in lieu of live testimony. (R., Vol. II, pp.229-
230.) The court granted Moses' request. (See Tr., Vol. I, pp.397-424 (testimony 
read into record).) Included within that testimony was the following exchange 
about the existence of an immunity agreement between Branam and the state: 
Q: By the terms of your immunity agreement here today, 
you realize you can't be prosecuted for what you've testified to? 
A: Right. 
(Tr., Vol. I, p.421, Ls.2-5.) 
While the immunity agreement itself was not introduced into evidence, the 
existence of an agreement certainly was. Moses' claim to the contrary is belied 
by the record. Moses' first claim of unpreserved error in relation to the 
prosecutor's closing argument fails. 
2. Based On The Evidence Presented At Trial, Moses Cannot 
Establish Fundamental Error With Respect To The Prosecutor's 
Comments Regarding The Terms Of The Immunity Agreement 
The immunity agreement between the state and Branam reads: 
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COMES NOW, BARRY MCHUGH, Prosecuting Attorney for 
Kootenai County, Idaho, and hereby agrees that Joshua Matthew 
Branam's testimony at the preliminary hearing in the above-
captioned matter will not be used against Joshua Matthew Branam 
in any manner in a criminal case, except that he may nevertheless 
be prosecuted or subjected to penalty for perjury, false swearing, or 
contempt committed in testifying at the aforementioned preliminary 
hearing. 
(R., Vol. I, p.31.) 
As previously noted, the precise language of this agreement was not 
introduced at Moses' trial. Rather, the evidence on this point was limited to 
Branam's testimony in which he agreed with the prosecutor that "[b]y the terms of 
[the] immunity agreement," he could not "be prosecuted for what [he] testified to." 
(Tr., Vol. I, p.421 , Ls.2-5.) The prosecutor discussed this evidence in closing 
argument, stating: 
You'll recall from the testimony that was read to you that Mr. 
Branam can't be testified -- can't be prosecuted for what he said in 
that statement that was read to you. He was given immunity. 
Basically it means that whatever he says he can't get in 
trouble for, so whatever he says might as well benefit himself. 
What benefits him is staying in [Moses'] good graces. 
(Tr., Vol. II, p.527, LS.3-9 (emphasis added).) 
Moses argues, for the first time on appeal, that the foregoing comment 
appearing in bold "was a lie" because U[t]he actual immunity agreement entered 
into between the State and Mr. Branam provided severe sanctions for false 
testimony." (Appellant's Brief, p.29 (emphasis original).) Regardless of how 
counsel on appeal might interpret the terms of the immunity agreement, the 
evidence presented at trial upon which the prosecutor commented was that "[b]y 
the terms of [the] immunity agreement," Branam could not "be prosecuted for 
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what [he] testified to." (Tr., Vol. I, p.421 , Ls.2-5.) The prosecutor's reiteration of 
this testimony and comment thereon was not improper. Moreover, although the 
written agreement provides that Branam could be "prosecuted or subjected to 
penalty for perjury, false swearing, or contempt committed in testifying at" Moses' 
preliminary hearing, the only evidence of what the parties intended by the 
agreement is what occurred during the exchange where the prosecutor 
represented, through his questioning, that Branam would not be prosecuted for 
his testimony. Moses' argument on appeal not only ignores the fact that the 
prosecutor's comments were based on the evidence presented at trial, it also 
presupposes a certain interpretation of the agreement without any evidentiary 
support. Moses' claim that the prosecutor's comment about Branam's immunity 
not only fails to show error, it fails to show constitutional error. Therefore, Moses 
has not met his burden under the first prong of Perry. 
Even if Moses could overcome the first step in the Perry analysis, he has 
failed to establish the error was plain or that it affected his substantial rights. 
Moses cannot satisfy the second prong for two reasons. First, the error is not 
plain because it is predicated on Moses' interpretation of a cold record without 
any information about the parties' intent and understanding of the immunity 
agreement. Second, the record is devoid of any "information as to whether the 
failure to object was a tactical decision," Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d 978, 
and Moses offers no argument as to why trial counsel, who clearly was not shy 
about objecting during the prosecutor's closing argument (see, ~, Tr., Vol. II, 
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pp.509, 512), could not have made a tactical decision not to object (see generally 
Appellant's Brief, pp.29-30). 
Regarding the third prong, Moses argues "there is a reasonable probability 
this misconduct affected the outcome of [his] trial" because "[m]ost of the 
exculpatory evidence in [his] trial came from Mr. Branam's preliminary hearing 
testimony that was read into the record." (Appellant's Brief, p.30.) While Moses' 
defense relied primarily on Branam's testimony at Moses' preliminary hearing in 
which Branam claimed he was solely responsible for the extortion and Moses 
was simply an unwitting participant, Branam's testimony was undermined by far 
more than the fact that Branam had an immunity agreement. Brian's testimony in 
the state's case-in-chief was alone sufficient to convict Moses, and it was only 
strengthened by the corroborating testimony of Phillip Connell. In addition, the 
credibility of Branam's testimony suffered as a result of his proclaimed use of 
methamphetamine use and memory difficulties, which are factors a jury would 
consider that are wholly unrelated to the immunity agreement. Further, as is 
standard, the court instructed the jury that the prosecutor's comments were not 
evidence (R., Vol. II, p.268), and that it must follow all of the court's instructions 
(R., p.279), which the jury is presumed to do. State v. Carson, 151 Idaho 713, 
718, 264 P.3d 54, 59 (2011) ("We presume that the jury followed the jury 
instructions given by the trial court in reaching its verdict.") Moses' claim of 
misconduct regarding the scope of the immunity agreement fails. 
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3. Moses Has Failed To Establish The Prosecutor Violated His Due 
Process Rights By Appealing To The Passions And Prejudices Of 
The JUry 
Moses' final claim of misconduct is based on the following unobjected-to 
statement made during rebuttal in reference to Branam's testimony: "You can 
take that transcript, and you can put it in the garbage. You don't have to rely on 
anything that that man said, nor should you." (Appellant's Brief, p.30 (quoting 
Tr., Vol. II, p.529, Ls.21-23 (emphasis omitted).) Moses contends, in conclusory 
fashion, that the prosecutor's characterization of Branam's testimony as 
"garbage" was "an improper appeal to the passions and prejudice of the jury." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.30.) Moses, however, fails to explain what sort of passion or 
prejudice such a statement invokes nor does he explain why this statement does 
not constitute a proper comment on the credibility of the evidence presented at 
trial. It is well-established that a prosecutor may comment on the credibility of 
witnesses so long as "the comment is based solely on inferences from evidence 
presented at trial." State v. Marmentini, 152 Idaho 269, ---,270 P.3d 1054, 1058 
(Ct. App. 2011) (citation omitted). The prosecutor's comment about Branam's 
testimony satisfied this standard. Moses has failed to establish otherwise. 
Accordingly, he has failed to demonstrate a violation of an unwaived 
constitutional right under the first prong of Perry. 
Moses has likewise failed to demonstrate the prosecutor's comments 
relating to Branam's testimony constitute plain error or that there is no need for 
additional information as to whether counsel's decision not to object was a 
tactical one. 
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Finally, for the reasons set forth in relation to Moses' previous misconduct 
claim, Moses has failed to establish the prosecutor's comments about Branam's 
testimony affected the outcome of the trial. 
VI. 
Moses Has Failed To Show Cumulative Error 
"The cumulative error doctrine requires reversal of a conviction when there 
is 'an accumulation of irregularities, each of which by itself might be harmless, 
but when aggregated, the errors show the absence of a fair trial, in contravention 
of the defendant's constitutional right to due process." State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 
576, 594, 261 P.3d 853, 871 (2011) (citations, quotations and alteration omitted). 
A necessary predicate to application of the cumulative error doctrine is a finding 
of more than one error. State v. Hawkins, 131 Idaho 396, 958 P.2d 22 (Ct. App. 
1998). In addition, cumulative error analysis does not include errors neither 
objected to nor found fundamental. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 230, 245 P.3d 
961, 982 (2010). 
Moses has failed to show any error, much less two or more errors. Thus, 
the doctrine of cumulative error does not apply in this case. See,~, LaBelle v. 
State, 130 Idaho 115,121,937 P.2d 427, 433 (Ct. App. 1997). 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Moses' judgment of 
conviction for grand theft by extortion with a persistent violator enhancement. 
DATED this 18th day of June, 2012. 
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